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No realist project in and about economics is close to completion. There 
are many open issues that remain to be addressed and resolved. Simon 
Deichsel (2011) has written a healthy challenge that should offer some 
useful inspiration to anyone interested in assessing and perhaps 
contributing to the realist projects. He argues against realism and in 
support of some sort of anti-realism. My response first deals with some 
conceptual issues regarding the very ideas of realism and anti-realism.   
I will then discuss the role of pragmatics in relation to truth. Finally, I 
will address the issue of justifying realism—Deichsel’s title, after all, 
suggests his challenge is directed against what he calls the pragmatic 
justification of realism. My remarks are both brief and selective.  
 
REALISM, ANTI-REALISM, AND SUSPENDING JUDGEMENT ABOUT TRUTH 
Deichsel defends what he calls anti-realism against realism. It is 
important to see how he defines “anti-realism” and that he does it 
disjunctively (Deichsel 2011, 24). Accordingly, anti-realism is the thesis 
that we should: 
 
[1] “suspend judgement on the truth and truth-worthiness of our 
theories” or  
 
[2] “avoid talking about the truth of theories altogether” and we 
should do so  
 
[3] “in order to minimize the confusions that surround this concept” 
(that of truth). 
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Each of these elements requires attention. Element [1] is particularly 
interesting when presented as a defining feature of anti-realism. It so 
happens that it is precisely this idea that I have emphasized elsewhere 
as (a) compatible with realism, and (b) important for realist accounts of 
some disciplines at some stages of their development (e.g., Mäki 2005). 
Let me explain. (a) First, [1] is compatible with what I have called 
minimal realism for which it is enough if a theory has a chance of being 
true, and that it is true or false in virtue of how the world works. I take 
anti-realism to deny this and to claim that theories have no chance of 
being true in this sense: either no talk about truth makes sense or truth 
should be conceived in terms other than how theories relate to the 
world (such as usefulness, coherence, or consensus). (b) Second, there 
are many situations (fields of inquiry, disciplines, stages of their 
development, and so forth) in which one should not rush to pass 
judgement about the truthfulness of a theory; one should rather 
suspend judgement, sometimes for long periods of time. One is not 
entitled to pass judgement because of the high degrees of epistemic 
uncertainty characteristic of these situations. The reasons for 
uncertainty can be many, such as the subject matter being very complex 
or otherwise hard to access; the discipline being at its formative or 
explorative stages of development; research being heavily shaped        
by commercial or ideological interests; and so on. 
Whatever the reason for uncertainty, in order to be able to suspend 
judgement on the truth of a theory in the first place, one must 
presuppose a minimal realism about theories having a chance of being 
true or false. This is independent of whether we are in an actual position 
to pass judgement. In short, I do not consider [1] an anti-realist 
principle at all. It is rather a realist principle well suited for research 
fields in situations characterized by severe epistemic uncertainty.     
Even radical scepticism—suspending judgement indefinitely—would be 
compatible with realism. 
There are of course many notions of realism available, and while 
Deichsel acknowledges this, it often seems he wants a realist to 
subscribe to something stronger than just minimal realism. He would 
like the realists to tell how epistemic access to the real world is 
ensured—what precise criteria, procedures, and standards to apply      
so as to be able to pass judgement. So it seems he would like me to 
subscribe to the possibility of what he calls “strong epistemic realism”. 
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But this is exactly what I have explicitly refused to advocate as the only 
sensible and defensible version of realism. 
When an anti-realist suspends judgement in the vein of Deichsel, [1] 
seems to suggest that the judgement is about truth rather than 
something else. And as I said, this presupposes minimal realism about 
truth. But then saying that realism “allows talking about truth where 
anti-realism suspends judgement on this matter” (Deichsel 2011, 34) is  
a little confusing given that one can obviously talk about truth without 
passing judgement. One does not need a lot of “talking about truth” in 
order for those suspended judgements to be about truth. 
What about [2] and [3]? Deichsel suggests that anti-realists avoid 
talking about truth in order to avoid confusions around the concept of 
truth. I am not attracted by this disjunct either. There are many 
confusing concepts around. Think of value, utility, preference, 
rationality, wellbeing, coordination, equilibrium, market, institutions 
(and economics!); or think of causation, explanation, theory, model, 
justified belief (or empirical adequacy and problem-solving capacity, 
Deichsel’s favourites). Should we (economists, philosophers of 
economics, or others) avoid talking about those things just because 
there is confusion around the concepts? Should we surrender rather 
than meet the challenge of bringing light to darkness? Should we take 
the easy way and avoid the hard task of trying to remove or minimize 
confusion? No, we should not—regardless of whether we are realists    
or anti-realists. Scientists talk about truth and falsehood and no doubt 
often do it in a confused and confusing manner. But I take it as the task 
of philosophy to remove or reduce conceptual confusion. With respect 
to truth talk, philosophy is nowadays in a much better position than 
some decades ago to do this thanks to the recent resurgence                 
of philosophical interest in theories of truth (see, e.g., Alston 1996; 
Vision 2004). 
 
TRUTH AND PRAGMATIC MATTERS 
As I see it, truth is not pragmatic, while pragmatics plays very important 
roles in the search for truths. Whatever we take the relevant truth 
bearers to be—such as thoughts, beliefs, sentences, propositions—they 
are true or false not in virtue of whether they are useful, convenient, 
justified, rationally acceptable, warrantedly assertable, persuasive, 
credible, collectively agreeable, or generally in virtue of having any such 
pragmatic property. Very roughly, truth bearers are true or false in 
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virtue of the way the world is. An assumption of increasing returns in  
an industry is true if the returns are increasing in that industry. A model 
of a real-world mechanism representing it as a positive feedback 
mechanism is true if the mechanism is a positive feedback mechanism. 
The assumption and the model are not true or false based on whether 
they are useful or convenient or persuasive, whether evidence is taken 
to support them or the research community generally accepts them as 
solving research problems. 
Even though I do not take truth to be pragmatic, it makes no sense 
to talk about truth in scientific inquiry without simultaneously talking 
about pragmatic matters. The relevant notion of truth is that of relevant 
truth. And relevance is pragmatic: whatever is relevant is so relative to 
goals, purposes, practices, questions, problems. This means relevant 
truths are relative to, or constrained by, purposes and problems, 
questions and quandaries. No truth is a relevant truth if it fails to serve 
a set purpose or to answer a posed question.  
The notion of relevant truth has two important consequences. One is 
that it helps see why and how all theories and models necessarily 
represent only very limited and selective aspects of some subject 
matter, and can do so truthfully. The correct selection or isolation is a 
function of the questions and purposes served. One isolation serves one 
purpose, while another serves another purpose. Some questions can be 
answered in terms of very simple models, while other questions may 
require very complex models.  
It is a mistake to think that a richer model is always more truthful 
per se. A related mistake is the common belief that a model can be 
taken closer to the truth by de-isolation, by relaxing its unrealistic 
assumptions and replacing them with more realistic assumptions, and 
in this way incorporating previously missing details. As I have 
frequently argued elsewhere (e.g., Mäki 2011a), a realist should be fully 
comfortable with simple models and unrealistic assumptions provided 
they serve good purposes such as the acquisition of relevant truths 
about simple facts of the matter. Therefore, it is not at all an anti-realist 
privilege to maintain that “more realistic assumptions are not always 
better ones” (Deichsel 2011, 39).  
I also do not see why Deichsel thinks it is a “realist fallacy” (that he 
attributes to Lawson) to assume that “higher realisticness […] should be 
an end in itself” (p. 38). Realists should not commit such a fallacy. Many 
relevant truths can be attained—and often can only be attained—with 
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lower degrees of realisticness. Naturally, this must be understood with a 
qualification that acknowledges the ambiguity of ‘(un)realisticness’: 
unrealistic (sensu A) models can be realistic (sensu B).  
The second important consequence of focusing on relevant truth 
rather than on truth per se is based on the recognition that relevance    
is a function of purposes and questions and that there are a variety      
of possible purposes and questions that themselves can and should be 
critically assessed. In order to be relevantly true, a truth bearer must    
be true and must serve a given purpose; relevance provides a link 
between truth and purposes. This means that a claim to relevant truth 
can be critically examined by separately raising questions about truth, 
about purposes, and about relevance. So if you want to challenge an 
economic model, or rather a family of models, you can ask (i) whether 
the models are true of their target; (ii) whether the models serve given 
purposes; and (iii) whether important purposes are being served. This 
simple classification gives us three forms of failure and helps us to be 
more focused in criticizing exercises of modelling. For example, within 
this framework, one can proceed to diagnose the alleged failure of 
macroeconomic models with respect to the present economic crisis, 
tracing the failure to its sources. 
Deichsel seems to think of science in terms of problem-solving and 
that this might somehow speak in favour of anti-realism. So let me     
put forth a few remarks on this. Problems are in the family of pragmatic 
matters that provide criteria of relevance. But just to talk about 
problems and problem-solving in general sounds too abstract. All 
inquiry is problem-solving of some sort, but this alone is not very 
informative simply because problems come in so many different 
varieties. At one end there are problems related to the existence of an 
entity or a numerical value of its property, while at the other end there 
are problems that, say, relate to the formal details of a mathematical 
technique.  
Varieties of problem-solving are differently related, if at all, to the 
big ambition of resolving the riddles of the real world. A realist would 
ask questions about this relationship, granting that there are many 
legitimate problem-solving activities that are only very indirectly related 
to the big ambition and that it is often difficult to determine whether 
they are so related at all. It is not clear to me on what basis an anti-
realist would ask such questions if science were conceived merely as 
generic problem-solving. 
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JUSTIFYING REALISM? 
It is important to see that “justifying realism” remains ambiguous as 
long as nothing more is said about the roles and goals of realism.      
One does not attempt to justify realism per se, one rather justifies 
realism in relation to the roles it plays and the goals it might help to 
attain. It is one thing to consider whether realism provides a correct 
(descriptive) account of economics. It is quite another thing to ask 
whether realism can somehow be used for making economics better.  
It seems that Deichsel officially focuses on the latter role of realism, 
which he then takes to require what he calls a “pragmatic justification” 
for realism. However, even though this is his official focus, he also 
extensively deals with the former role and the associated justifications, 
but fails to clearly connect the two roles with one another. This is 
important since this connection is the key to seeing my weak version of 
the “pragmatic justification” of realism. 
One example of considering realism as a philosophical account of 
science is Deichsel’s discussion of the no-miracle argument. This is part 
of the standard literature on scientific realism in the philosophy of 
science. In the standard accounts, scientific realism is presented as a 
strongly pro-science philosophy. It is presumed that science is a great 
success story, manifested in its predictive and technological 
achievements. Scientific realism is offered as a philosophy that explains 
this fact and thereby removes the apparent miracle of success. Scientific 
realism—defined as the claim that science has mostly gotten its theories 
true of the unobservable world that exists mind-independently—is 
presented as the best explanation for why science is successful. Because 
realism best explains a property of science, it is the correct description 
of science. This is abductive inference applied in philosophical inquiry. 
I have argued elsewhere that this argument is of little relevance in 
the case of economics—simply because there is no obvious fact of 
success to be explained. Yet most of my attempts to defend realism also 
deal with the first (descriptive) role of realism in regard to economics, 
and do so without appealing to the no-miracle argument. 
One of my goals—that Deichsel fails to acknowledge—has been to 
check whether a scientific realist account of economics is feasible.    
This part of my work largely relates to the debates over realism in the 
general philosophy of science. In these debates, some contributors have 
argued that scientific realism is an adequate philosophy of parts of 
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science only. Indeed, it turns out that standard formulations of 
scientific realism are hospitable to successful physical sciences, while 
the social sciences threaten not to be accommodated: the latter are 
neither obviously successful nor do they deal with mind-independent 
unobservables, and the like. I have argued that scientific realism must 
be reformulated so as to make it more encompassing. This project not 
only has shown what modifications are needed in scientific realism to 
make it more broadly applicable, but it has also highlighted interesting 
and important differences between (families) of scientific disciplines. 
This has been part of my larger project on interdisciplinarity: scientific 
realism provides a philosophical framework within which disciplinary 
diversity can be examined (see Mäki 1996; 2005; 2011b). This is a 
descriptive project in regard to economics and other disciplines, but at 
the same time, it has consequences for how to improve our philosophical 
understanding of science by way of acknowledging disciplinary diversity 
(see Mäki 2011c). One might think that insofar as realism plays either or 
both of these roles with success (illuminating scientific diversity and 
improving the philosophical understanding of science), this will provide 
support to it.  
This last observation relates to another ambiguity in “justifying 
realism”: the very idea of justification can be taken to mean a number of 
different things. It is not fully clear to me what Deichsel takes it to 
mean. Given that his general suspicion seems to be that I have not given 
arguments for realism, one could infer that he has a very stringent view 
of what counts as justification. I have provided arguments that support 
scientific realism or at least show that scientific realism is compatible 
with certain important facts about economics, but this may not be 
strong enough for Deichsel, given his implicitly strong notion of 
justification. He may expect to see arguments that show why realism is 
necessary for accomplishing the tasks assigned to it. I am not sure my 
arguments have this much power, but I am convinced they do have 
some power—enough to justify calling them justifications. 
Many of the arguments I have developed over the years have the 
structure of even-if arguments. I have sought to argue that even if this 
or that feature of economics (or its parts) is granted, there is no 
compelling reason to adopt a non-realist or anti-realist view of the 
discipline. This stands in contrast to what one might expect or what has 
been argued by some commentators. Even if economics uses models 
with false assumptions… Even if the predictions yielded by economic 
MÄKI / PUZZLED BY REALISM 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 49 
models often fail, even miserably… Even if economics deals with highly 
formalized mathematical structures… Even if the economy and the 
scientific study of it are socially constructed… Even if rhetorical 
persuasion plays an important role… And so on. These are arguments 
against the necessity of anti-realism once those features are granted;    
or in other words, the arguments show that those features alone are not 
sufficient for anti-realism. At the same time, they are arguments in 
support of the possibility of realism about economics. They rule out 
arguments against realism rather than provide direct supportive 
arguments for realism. Yet I find it natural to say that ruling out certain 
arguments against realism is a way of supporting realism. To provide 
support is to provide justification. But it is not to prove, or to justify 
beyond any further doubt or question. 
These arguments do not constitute what Deichsel calls pragmatic 
justification. So it is somewhat incomplete to say that “Mäki’s 
justification for taking a realist position is pragmatic insofar as he fears 
that giving up realism ‘would result in the worst kind of complacency’ 
[…] I call this a pragmatic justification, because it focuses on the good 
consequences that an adoption of realism would have” (Deichsel 2011, 
24). His question is “whether Mäki can live up to the task of improving 
economics by means of his realism” (p. 27). 
In pursuing a descriptive philosophical account of economics in 
interdisciplinary comparison, and in contributing to the revision of 
scientific realism in the philosophy of science, it is not my direct 
intention to help improve economics—and my proposals should be 
judged independently of such intentions or expectations. Yet I admit 
that this work is partly (but not completely) motivated by ideas about 
how realism might help improve economics, but these consequences are 
indirect. 
It is also somewhat questionable to talk about “improving 
economics” and “good consequences” in the abstract as if these were 
well understood and shared ideas among people holding different 
philosophical outlooks—as if, that is, realist and anti-realist views of 
scientific progress were indistinguishable. But something like this may 
indeed be what Deichsel is suggesting, at least insofar as my realism and 
his species of anti-realism are concerned.  
He asks me to show how my version of realism “would lead to an 
improvement of economic research and which standards it would 
specifically employ apart from standards that are compatible with anti-
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realism such as problem-solving capacity and empirical adequacy” 
(Deichsel 2011, 33). He himself does not expect realism and anti-realism 
to stand apart since “adopting realism does not lead to normative 
implications that are unavailable to the anti-realist” (p. 38). Therefore  
he says “realism” as I use it is “merely a brand-name” (p. 32). I suppose 
this implies that he takes “anti-realism” to be a brand-name as well.  
I remain unconvinced. Consider the two distinctions I have proposed 
for distinguishing different research strategies and that Deichsel also 
discusses. One is between surrogate modelling and substitute 
modelling; the other is between merely derivational unification and 
ontological unification. The first couple highlights the importance of 
modelling in economics, while the second focuses on the highly valued 
goal of unification in economics. I always thought these distinctions 
only make sense against the background of some sort of realism and 
that a realist would emphasize the importance of surrogate modelling 
and ontological unification, while an anti-realist could be content with 
substitute modelling (a sort of problem-solving activity if you wish) and 
derivational unification (for which saving the phenomena and empirical 
adequacy will suffice). 
One might say that even though the above two distinctions perhaps 
make conceptual sense, they do not make operational sense. There are 
no well-defined criteria or standards in terms of which we can tell apart 
the two kinds of modelling and the two kinds of unification. This seems 
to be what Deichsel thinks. For example, he believes that my distinction 
between ontological and merely derivational unification is useless 
without “a unique standard to distinguish the two modes of unification” 
(p. 33). Likewise, the ontological www (the way the world works) 
constraint on theories and models (one that I have claimed to have 
found in economic research practice) “is hardly a constraint at all if we 
cannot know when it is met” (p. 33). In the same vein, one may argue 
that there is no sensible distinction between realist and anti-realist 
conceptions of progress given that similar standards are being used. 
What to make of this? My immediate reaction would be to say that    
I do not think operationism is any better as a principle constraining 
philosophical theorizing than it is in constraining scientific theorizing. 
In both cases, a realist insists on keeping apart the thing and our ways 
of measuring and knowing it. On the other hand, it is naturally a major 
challenge to develop ways of measuring and knowing and 
understanding things—these are the methods, procedures, criteria, and 
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standards used in science. And just as there may be progress in theories 
and models of the world, there may be progress in methods and 
standards, and these two kinds of progress depend on one another. 
Moreover, just as we need many (kinds of) mutually interacting and 
progressing theories and models to represent and explain the world,   
we need many (kinds of) interacting and progressing methods and 
standards for building and assessing those theories (including 
Deichsel’s favourites, empirical adequacy, problem-solving capacity, and 
fit with the totality of current knowledge—themselves hard to apply 
unambiguously). Against this background, asking for a “unique” 
(perhaps final and fixed?) standard does not sound entirely appropriate. 
My view is strongly fallibilist regarding both theories about the world 
and the criteria for assessing those theories as to how well they provide 
us with epistemic access to the world. 
I do think realism is important for avoiding “the worst kind of 
complacency” associated with mere rhetorical games, substitute 
modelling, derivational unification, intellectual autism. It is in terms     
of realism that these practices can be (descriptively) conceptualized in 
the first place, and can then be (normatively) identified as instances of 
misguided complacency that should be avoided. Preaching realism—also 
by showing that most economists already share realism regardless       
of what their self-understanding happens to suggest—is a way of trying 
to bring all parties at the same table. A genuine debate cannot even 
begin if some participants play a very different intellectual game           
(a game, the realist might add, that escapes issues of accountability      
in trying to solve the riddles of the universe and to help us manage    
our ways in it). If realism can contribute to the articulation of a shared 
framework within which progress-enhancing debate can take place, it 
comes to play a role in improving economics. If this is taken to justify 
realism, it is not compelling enough to preclude all further inquiry and 
debate. I doubt such a compelling justification will ever be forthcoming. 
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